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INTRODUCTION

In one of last term's most notable decisions, the United States
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States 1 considered the meaning of the tax exemption provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) and the relationships among the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), Congress, and the courts in formulating
tax policy. Affirming an IRS ruling2 that denied tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools, the Court devised a model
for the interaction of the three branches of government in tax policy matters. This model assigns to the IRS primary authority to
develop rules governing the implementation of the tax exemption
laws and assigns to the courts and Congress secondary authority to
oversee the IRS. The decision seems to alter the earlier model in
which the courts had retained primary authority to determine statutory intent and to review IRS actions in the tax exemption area.
Furthermore, the Court interpreted the applicable Code provisions
under which Bob Jones University claimed tax exemption as requiring that the institution confer a "public benefit" and have a
purpose in harmony with a "common community conscience.''3
This Article questions the tax policy model that the Court articulated in Bob Jones University. The authors believe that the
Court's recognition of the primacy of IRS rulemaking is undesirable because the IRS, as an executive agency, is susceptible to the
influence of the incumbent administration's policy objectives. Further, even though the life-tenured status of judges insulates the
courts from external political pressures, significant problems are
also present in a model in which the courts occupy a primary role
in formulating tax policy. In sum, Congress is better suited than
either the courts or the IRS to determine tax policy because it is
institutionally organized to gather social and economic data, to define policy objectives, and to legislate to achieve these objectives,
which often have repercussions beyond the circumstances of a particular case.
This Article's criticism of Bob Jones University also extends
to the Court's "public benefit" and "common community conscience" standards for charitable organizations seeking to qualify
for tax exemptions. Although restrictive standards suggest that a
tax exemption is a form of government aid, the Court declined to
1. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
2. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29; see infra notes 33·56 and accompanying text.
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make this holding explicitly:' Moreover, the majority's recognition
of the IRS's broad rulemaking authority seems inconsistent with
the "community conscience" standard, for in the exercise of its
broad administrative discretion the IRS need not strictly follow
this standard. Finally and most significantly, the "public benefit"
and "community conscience" standards may discourage organizations that provide a healthy diversity of views in a pluralistic
society.
This Article begins with a general discussion in part II of the
role of the courts in the development of federal tax policy.15 A critical analysis of the Bob Jones University decision-focusing upon
both the specific tax exemption issue and the Court's general
model for tax policy decisionmaking-follows in part ill.6 Part IV
concludes the Article with a recommendation that Congress act definitively to take the lead in formulating tax policy.'7
II.

TAX POLICY AND THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Congress, the courts, and the executive branch-through the
IRS and the Treasury Department-historically have all interacted
in formulating tax policy. Congress, of course, has contributed tax
legishition-legislation that has evolved from the Revenue Act of
1913 to the extraordinarily complex rules of the present Internal
Revenue Code. The Treasury Department and the IRS have added
extensive regulations and rulings to the already unwieldy tax legislation. Courts then have attempted to work their way through the
resulting murkiness-the "dank, miasmic, myxomycetous sump.''8
Judge Learned Hand artfully described the difficulty confronting
the courts:
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax • • . merely dance before my
eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception
upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold
of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed, purport. . . . I ·know that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity . . . ; one cannot help wondering
whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are
See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 16-120 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The PracticaliTa:c Reform and the ABA's CSTR, in B. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MuSGRAVE & J.
PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INcoME TAX BASE? 89 (1968) (reprints articles and additional
remarks by these authors from 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) and 81 HARv. L. REv. 44, 63,
1016, and 1032 (1968)).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
ties of
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strung together with syntactical correctness.8

Notwithstanding the difficulties of interpretation, the courts
profoundly have influenced the development of tax law. As one
commentator noted, "Congress has the first word in [tax formulation] ... but the courts have the last word." 10 Similarly, as two
former Justice Department officers observed, "Frequently, a
phrase in a ruling, a court opinion, or even an argument in a government tax brief can have as much impact on tax policy as a new
federal tax statute.''11 A court's determination of tax policy generally serves to refine congressional legislation to fit contemporary
needs. Unlike tax legislation, which "prospectively formulates rules
with universal applicability[,] . . . tax litigation formulates rules
retrospectively, aiming principally at resolving disputes of immediate concern. " 12
Thus, under this traditional model the courts had primary authority to shape the meaning of the Code, usually after a private
party's challenge of an IRS directive 13 or procedure,14 or the government's appeal of an unfavorable lower court decision. u Bob
Jones University is significant because it alters the structure of
decisionmaking by placing primary supervisory authority in the
IRS.
III. Bob Jones University v. United States
Bob Jones University calls itself "the world's most unusual
university." 16 Although unaffiliated with any established church,
the University is dedicated to the teaching and propagation of fundamentalist religious ~eliefs. 17 In pursuit of these goals the University dictates strict rules of conduct for its students.18 To enforce
9. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
10. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 656 (1954 ed.).
11. Ferguson & Henzke, The Formulation of Federal Tax Policy Through Litigation,
1 VA. TAX REv. 85, 85 (1981).
12. Id. at 86.
13. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983) (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)); see infra text accompanying note 22.
14. See, e.g., Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3109 (1983); infra note 95.
15. See Ferguson & Henzke, supra note 11, at 91-98.
16. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734 (1974).
17. Id.
18. For example,
The institution does not permit dancing, card playing, the use of tobacco, movie-going,
and other such forms of indulgences in which worldly young people often engage; no
student will release information of any kind to any local newspaper, radio station, or
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one such rule forbidding interracial dating and marriage, the University denies admission to applicants engaged in or known to advocate interracial dating and marriage. 19
The Bob Jones University controversy began in November
1970 when the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Kennedy 20 enjoined the ms from according
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. The Green court suggested that the ffiS would not be permitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate the
government's public policy of nondiscrimination. The ffiS then reversed its position of granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory institutions and notified the University that it intended to
challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies.21 In response, the University in
1971 sought to enjoin the ms from revoking its tax-exempt status.
television station without first checking with the University Public Relations Director;
students are expected to refrain from singing, playing, and, as far as possible, from
"tuning-in" on the radio or playing on the record player jazz, rock-and-roll, folk rock,
or any other types of questionable music; and, no young man may walk a girl on canlpus unless both of them have a legitimate reason for going in the same direction.
Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organizations, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 925, 925 (1979) {quoting Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978)).
19. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983). The sponsors of
the University believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. Id. at 2022.
20. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). The IRS decision
to deny tax-exempt status to discrinlinatory private schools was in accord with plaintiffs'
argument in Green that to grant tax exemptions to schools that violate the important public
policy objectives established in Brown v. Board of Educ. and the Civil Rigqts Act of 1964
would be improper. See IRS News Release (July 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, July 11, 1970, at A1,
col. 8. The court made permanent the Green v. Kennedy temporary injunction in Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Until the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Bob Jones University, the precedential effect of Green was unclear. In
Boh Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), the Court claimed that since the IRS was no
longer maintaining an adversarial position against the plaintiffs in Green at the time of the
trial, "the [Supreme] Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case
involving a truly adversary controversy." Id. at 740 n.11.
21. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023. Prior to 1971, Boh Jones University completely excluded blacks. From 1971 to 1975, the University accepted applications from
blacks married within their race. Since May 1975, the University has permitted unmarried
blacks to enroll subject to this disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial dating and marriage.
See id. The Fourth Circuit's decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975),
a{f'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), influenced the University's decision to opon its admissions to
blacks. McCrary held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private schools from denying admissions to students on the basis of race. 515 F.2d at 1086-87. McCrary, however, did not address whether a private school can deny admissions on the basis of race as a matter of
religious belief.
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That suit culminated in a 1974 Supreme Court decision that "prohibited the University from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive action before the assessment or collection of any tax. "22
The IRS in January 1976 formally revoked the University's
tax exemption.28 Mter paying a portion of the federal unemployment taxes due, the University filed suit for a refund, contending
that it was statutorily and constitutionally entitled to reinstatement of its tax exemption.2 " In April1981 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the revocation of the exemption.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones
University and in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States, 26 a case presenting identical issues. On January 8, 1982, the
Justice Department petitioned the Court to vacate these cases as
moot in light of the Reagan administration's decision to reinstate
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.27
Because of a related court order that prevented the administration
22. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023 (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416

u.s. 725 (1974)).

23. Revenue Ruling 71-447 formally established the policy of prohibiting the granting
of tax exemptions to private schools that maintained racially discriminatory policies. Rev.
Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Revenue Procedure 72-54 required private schools to publicize
their nondiscriminatory policies, although it demanded no particular method of publication.
Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The IRS in 1975 updated its stipulations for private
schools seeking tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 75-50 provided guidelines and mandated recordkeeping to assess whether a private school's policies were racially nondiscriminatory. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The regulation mandates that tax-exempt institutions: (a) adopt formally nondiscriminatory policies in their charters or bylaws, (b) refer to
such policies in their advertising brochures, and (c) publish annual notice of such policies in
a local newspaper of general circulation. Id. §§ 4.01-.03, 1975-2 C.B. 587-88. See Devins, Tax
Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A Legislative Proposal, 20 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 153, 157 (1983). The IRS in 1975 also published a revenue ruling denying taxexempt status to any religious institution that maintained racially discriminatory policies,
even if sincere religious belief was the basis of that discrimination. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1
C.B. 158. Current IRS policies rely on those two 1975 rulings. For a general description of
federal governmental actions on this issue prior to the Reagan policy shift, see Devins,
supra, at 155-61.
24. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023.
25. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981). The district court
had concluded that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status on both statutory and
first amendment grounds. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 897-98
(D.S.C. 1978).
26. 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The Court heard both cases simultaneously.
27. Memorandum for the United States, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). In addition, on January
8, 1982, the IRS announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service will no longer deny tax-exempt status for . . . organizations on the grounds
that they don't conform with certain fundamental public policies." IRS News Release (Jan.
8, 1982).
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from reinstating this status/8 however, the administration withdrew its request that the Court declare the cases moot. 29 The Supreme Court denied tax exemptions to the two petitioner schools
on May 24, 1983.30 In its decision the Court made certain general
pronouncements both on the meaning of the Code's tax exemption
provision and on the ffiS's authority to issue rulings in accordance
with its own interpretation of the Code. 31 The majority held that a
tax-exempt institution must confer some "public benefit" and that
its purpose must not be at odds with the "common community
conscience."32 The Court further held that the ffiS has broad authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code and to issue rulings
based on its interpretation.
A.

The Meaning of the Tax Exemption Provision

Section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides that "[c]orporations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
. or educational purposes" are entitled to tax-exempt status:33
28. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982).
29. See Babcock, Administration &ks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue,
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4; Taylor, School Tax Issue Put to High Court in
Shift by Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at AI, col. 1. The government, however, did not
change its position that the IRS lacked authority to promulgate procedures denying taxexempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. Thus, the Court felt compelled to
appoint "counsel adversary"-William T. Coleman, Jr.,-to argue the government's side of
the case. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 50 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982). For a critique of this Court decision, see
Devins, Is the Supreme Court on the Reagan Team?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 3, 1982,
at 22; McCoy & Devins, Does the Bob Jones Case Meet the Case-or-Controversy Requirement?, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
30. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
31. The Court also ruled against Bob Jones University on its clainl that the first
amendment's free-exercise-of-religion clause blocked the IRS from implementing its racial
nondiscrimination policy against the University. The Court held that "the Government has
a fundamental overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . .
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits
places on [the University's] exercise of [its] religious beliefs." I d. at 2035. For a discussion of
the religious liberty issue raised in Bob Jones University, see Laycock, Tax Exemptions for
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv. 259 (1982); Neuberger & Cmmplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom
and Racial Integration, 48 FoRDHAM L. REv. 229, 258-75 (1979); Note, The Judicial Role in
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378,
401-04 (1979). For a critique of the Court's ruling on the religious liberty issue, see Devins,
Did the High Court Go Too Far to Make a Politically Popular Ruling?, NAT'L L.J., June 20,
1983, at 13, col. 1.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29. The Court did not reach the issue of whether an organization
could receive tax-exempt status if it violated some public policy but also conferred some
public benefit. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976); see also id. § 501(a) (providing that an organization de-
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Applying this section, the IRS had ruled that to qualify for tax
exemption an institution must demonstrate that it falls within one
of the categories defined in that section and that its activity is not
contrary to settled public policy.34 The IRS felt that the settled
public policy was that the section 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization-even if not qualifying as a "charitable" organization-must
be charitable in the common law sense. The common law notion of
charity includes an effort to further a public purpose.311 The University contested the Service's construction of the tax exemption
provision, arguing that the position of the IRS contradicted the
statute's plain language and legislative history and that the IRS
had adopted the faulty reasoning of the Green court.38
In its "plain language" argument the University emphasized
the absence of any statutory language that expressly required all
scribed in § 501(c) shall be exempt from taxation unless such exemption is denied under §
502 or § 503). The complete text of§ 501(c)(3), specifying those organizations qualifying for
tax exemption, follows:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Subchapter F of the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 501-28, is an elaborately detailed set of
statutory rules providing tax exemptions for varions qualifying organizations. Section 501(a)
provides generally for exemption from tax for those organizations described in subsections
(c) and (d). Subsection (c) lists 22 organizations that enjoy tax exemption, and subsection
(d) describes certain religious or apostolic organizations. In particular, § 501(c)(3) describes
certain types of organizations that not only enjoy tax-exempt status but also afford generally deductible contributions under§ 170. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see Brief of Amicus Curiae
William T. Coleman, Jr. at 11-44, Bob Jones Univ.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26.
36. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bob Jones Univ. For a discussion of Green, see infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., concerned similar arguments. Goldsboro is a private
elementary and secondary school that denied admissions to blacks, supposedly for religious
reasons. Goldsboro challenged the denial of its tax-exempt status in much the same way
that Bob Jones University had done. The two cases were joined before the Supreme Court.
454 U.S. 892 (1981). Because the statutory and tax policy issues raised in Goldsboro are
identical to those issues in Bob Jones University, the two cases can be treated as identical
for the purposes of this Article. The two cases, however, do differ on the religious liberty
issue. The government has a stronger interest in preventing a school from denying admissions to blacks than in limiting a school's interracial social relationships. See Weeks &
Devins, First Amendment Free Exercise Protections, 6 LEx. CoLLEGII 1 (Summer 1982).
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exempt organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense
of providing some public benefit. The University maintained that
the disjunctive "or" separating the categories in section 501(c)(3)
precluded this reading of the statute and that any organization
falling within the specified categories automatically qualified for an
exemption.37 This "plain language" argument relied on decisions in
which the Court refused to transfer the meaning of one statutory
term to another employed in the disjunctive.38 Similarly, the University condemned the IRS's attempt "to make 'religious' an adjective modifying 'charitable'" as equally untenable.39
The majority, however, rejected the "plain language"
argument:
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court
should go beyond tbe literal language of a statute if reliance on that language
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute . . . . "[I]n interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute • . .
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see also Brief for Petitioner at 10-23, Bob Jones Univ.
38. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Defendants in Reiter contended that Clayton Act coverage of "'[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property'" should extend only to "business activity or property related to one's business."
!d. at 337-38. The Court, however, disagreed:
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive "or" and rob the
term "property" of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it would convert the noun "business" into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to
give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. . • • Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless
the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. ... Congress' use of the word "or"
makes plain that "business" was not intended to modify "property," nor was "property" intended to modify "business".
!d. at 338-39 (citations omitted).
39. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Bob Jones Univ. The University also contended that
"where substantial constitutional issues under the Religion Clauses would arise by virtue of
the extension to religious institutions of a governmental requirement, this Court has held
that the extension may not be left to implication, but instead 'there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.'" !d. (relying upon NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)). This contention is without merit. First, the
Catholic Bishop decision, upon which the University based this argument, presented the
Court with an opportunity to vindicate the Bishop's position on either statutory or constitutional grounds. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977)
(NLRB cannot order representation elections for lay teachers in Catholic high schools on
both statutory and first amendment grounds). Bob Jones University did not present the
Court with such a choice because the Court viewed the school's religious liberty claim as
subsidiary to the government's interest in racial nondiscrimination. Second, the Court in
Catholic Bishop recognized that "the amendment may not be substituted for construction
and that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with
constitutional limitation." Yu Cong Eng. v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926). In short, the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University did not address the Catholic Bishop issue.
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and the objects and policy of the law . . . ." 40

The majority adopted the view that the common law of charitable
trusts had guided the enactment of section 501(c)(3) 41 and that
Congress had expressly adopted the common law's public benefit
rationale for charitable exemptions:
"The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."41

In unusually sweeping language, the majority then articulated its
standards for exemptions:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the
work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. . . • The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be
conferred.•s

The University was not entitled to tax-exempt status under
these standards because "an educational institution engaging in
practices affirmatively at odds with [the government's] declared
position [on racial nondiscrimination] . . . cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and stabilizing influence in community life.' " 44
Further, "In determining what purposes may benefit the community and what organizations are therefore exempt, public benefit
must be measured by present social and governmental legal and
moral standards, rather than those in existence at the time section
501 was enacted. " 415 Under such contemporary standards46 the
Court recognized that the " 'legitimate educational function [of a
racially discriminatory private school] cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices. . . . [D]iscriminatory treatment exerts a
pervasive influence on the entire educational process.' " 47 The
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194
(1857) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REv. 477, 485-99 (1981)).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938)).
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (emphasis supplied).
44. ld. at 2032 (quoting Walz v. Tax Com'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)}.
45. Simon, supra note 41, at 488; see 103 S. Ct. at 2029 n.20.
46. Racial discrimination in education officially did not become a public wrong until
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973))
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majority thus concluded that "[i]t would be wholly incompatible
with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities."4 s
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, endorsed the University's argument that the legislative history militated against a finding that section 501(c)(3) required common law charitability. His
dissent traced the evolution of the tax exemption provision and
rejected finding "some additional, undefined public policy requirement.""' He concluded "that the legislative history of § 501(c)(3)
unmistakably makes clear that Congress has decided what organizations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit
within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in §
501(c)(3) the characteristics of such organizations."110 Nonetheless,
Justice Rehnquist could not persuade the majority of the absence
of the common law notion of charity in the section.
Justice Powell, concurring, avoided making broad pronouncements on the meaning and purpose of the tax exemption provision.
Instead, he confined his analysis to the narrow issue of whether
"there are now sufficient reasons for accepting the IRS's construction of the Code as proscribing tax exemptions for schools that discriminate on the basis of race as a matter of policy."111 In trying to
discern the legislative intent behind the provision, Justice Powell
attributed great weight to the refusal of Congress to act on proposals that would have overturned the IRS's nondiscrimination policy112 and to the amendment of the Code that denies tax exemp(emphasis supplied by the Court).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2030.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2041 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the dissent). Justice
Powell's concurring opinion also was sympathetic to this reading:
It also is clear that the language [of§ 501(c)(3)] itself does not mandate refusal of taxexempt status to any private school that maintains a racially discriminatory admissions
policy. Accordingly, there is force in Justice Rehnquist's argument .... Indeed, were
we writing prior to the history detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the
construction that I would adopt.
Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. As the majority noted, "During the past 12 years there have been no fewer than 13
bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of§ 501(c)(3). Not one of these bills has
emerged from any committee, although Congress had enacted numerous other amendments
to § 501 during the same period ..•." Id. at 2033. Justice Rehnquist, however, thought
this evidence irrelevant: "[W]e have said before, and it is equally applicable here, that this
type of congressional inaction is of virtually no weight in determining legislative intent. . . .
These bills and related hearings indicate little more than that a vigorous debate has existed
in Congress concerning the new IRS position." Id. at 2043 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cita-

1364

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1353

tions to racially discriminatory private clubs.158 Consequently,
although he read the disjunctive "or" in the statute to indicate
that Congress did not intend a common law "charitable" gloss to
apply to each category, he concurred with the majority's result because "there has been a decade of acceptance [by Congress] that is
persuasive in the circumstances of this case. " 154
The majority did not address directly the University's argument that Green was a bad decision. 1515 Although the Court reached
its decision on the "public benefit" theory, it did suggest that the
Green "public policy" doctrine was good law.158
tions omitted). As it relates to the relevance of proposed legislation, this position does not
seem unreasonable. Still, these affirmative acts by Congress indicate that it both recognized
and supported the racial nondiscrimination requirement. See infra note 53.
53. See 26 U.S.C. -§ 501(c) (1976). Congress amended the Code in response to the District Court for the District of Columbia's decision in McGlotten v. Connally, which held, in
part, that nonprofit private clubs that excluded nonwhites from membership were entitled
to tax-exempt status. 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972). This legislation indicates that
Congress supports nondiscrimination as a social policy, as the Senate Committee Report on
the amendment illustrates: "[l]t is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club ..• to
be exempt from taxation if its written policy is to discriminate on account of race, color or
religion." S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 6051, 6058. Further, as the majority in Bob Jones University noted, Coogreas had
demonstrated its approval of racial nondiscrimination for tax-exempt private schools: "Con·
gress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when
enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acqui·
escence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings [including Rev. Rul.
41-477]." 103 S. Ct. at 2033. For a general discussion of Congress' recognition of the nondiscrimination requirement, see Devins, supra note 23, at 161-63. See also Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 300 (1981) (Congress' failure to change an agency ruling is an implicit acceptance
of that ruling).
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. The University had contended that Green repreSented "an elaborate, but insupportable, effort to write a provision into the Internal Revenue Code which the Congress did
not write and did not imply." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 17-18. Although Green
discussed the public benefit theory, that decision's primary basis was the doctrine that the
tax exemption provision must be construed to avoid frustrations of public policy. See Green
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.D.C. 1971); Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemp·
tions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Organizations on Statutory and Con·
stitutional Grounds, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 156, 160, 164 (1982).
56. "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in
the law of the trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate
established public policy." 103 S. Ct. at 2028.
The Green court's "public policy" rule relied on cases concerned with the deduction of
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 162 of the Code, particularly on Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). In Tank Truck the Court disallowed the deduction of fines paid by truck owners who had violated the state's maximum
weight laws. The Court declared that it would deny deductions that would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced
by some governmental declaration thereof." 356 U.S. at 33-34. Tank Truck, however, may
be of limited value in the tax exemption context. Its holding applies only to situations "in
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1. Analysis of the Public Benefit Doctrine

The legislative histories of tax laws throughout this century
support the majority's holding that tax exempt organizations must
provide some public benefit. In the floor debate over the Tariff Act
of 1894,117 which provided tax exemptions for organizations "organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes,"118 Congress made clear that these tax benefits were
available because the organizations served desirable public purposes.119 The legislative histories of subsequent taxing acts have reaffirmed this rationale, 60 as the following excerpt from a 1938 Congressional report illustrates.
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwhich an allowance of the deductions would amount to 'a device to avoid the consequence of
violations of a law.' " Simon, supra note 41, at 497 (quoting Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356
U.S. 28, 29 (1958)). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 19.
In contrast, although tax-exempt status may be important to an organization's very
existence, "to the extent that the organization's alleged public policy violation violates a
federal or state statute, the granting of the exemption does not mitigate the consequence of
the violation." Note, supra note 55, at 168. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at
19. But see Simon, supra note 41, at 497-500 (suggesting that the "public policy" doctrine
applies to tax-exempt private schools, despite the Tank Truck limitation). Moreover, what
would happen if an organization partially deviated from public policy? "(l]f the Green [public policy] rationale is accepted, that if any organization, otherwise exempt under
§ 501(c)(3), were to discriminate on account of age, maintain unsafe or unhealthful working
conditions, create any financial barrier to education based on sex, or create any environmental disharmony, that organization's tax exemption would have to be denied.'' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 20 (footnote omitted). See also Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note
31, at 272-73. Cf. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1229 (1979)
(statement of Charles A. Bane, Co-Chairman, Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 470 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
The Green court incorrectly relied on the business deduction cases to support the proposition that tax-exempt organizations must conform with public policy before individuals
can take a deduction for their contributions to these organizations. These cases are relevant
only to the issue of defining "ordinary and necessary" expenses for purposes of determining
taxable income. It is pure conjecture to suggest that judicial rulings on what is a permissible
deduction for purposes of determining taxable income carry over to the charitable deduction
issue. Even more egregious than this reasoning by conjecture, the income tax deduction
cases do not support the Green public policy formulation. For a general discussion of the
Green ruling, see also McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness on the Issue of Tax
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. __ (1984)
(forthcoming).
57. Cb. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
58. Id. at 556.
59. 26 CoNG. REc. 585-86 (1894).
60. See, e.g., 50 CoNG. REc. 1305 (1913); 44 CoNG. REc. 4147, 4150 (1909).
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wise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. 61

The same rationale-the service of desirable public purposes-underlies the allowance of deductions for contributions to
charitable organizations. When Congress in 1917 enacted a companion provision to section 501(c)(3) providing for these deductions (under what is now section 170(c)(2)), the debate emphasized
the requirement of a public benefit: "For every dollar that a man
contributes for these public charities, educational, scientific, or
otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent."62 In a similar vein, the
legislative history included the following:
[The charitable deduction] would remove the absurdity of exacting a tax even
on that share of a man's income which he devotes not at all to himself, but to
the pressing needs of educational and charitable institutions which operate
without private profit. The exaction of such a tax is, at this time, worse than
an absurdity. . . . It passes beyond individuals and strikes at America's
whole organization for social progress and education, the relief of distress,
and the remedy of evils.63

Relying on these legislative histories, the majority correctly concluded that the IRS acted properly under its rulemaking authority
when it determined in 1971 to deny tax-exempt status unless an
organization both fell within one of the categories described in section 501(c)(3) and did not engage in activities contrary to settled
public policy. 64
2. Analysis of the Common Community Conscience
Requirement
Although a tax exemption standard properly may require that
an organization have a public purpose or confer a public benefit,
the majority's requirement of conformity to the common community conscience goes too far. Even more significantly, this requirement could stifle the development of new ideas.615 A common com61. HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1938, H.R. REP. No.
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). For an excellent early analysis, see Reiling, Federal
Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958) (in accord with Bob
Jones University).
·
62. 55 CoNG. REc. 6714, 6728 (1917) (statement of Senator Hollis).
63. !d. at 6729 (reprinting "Do Not Penalize Generosity," Boston Transcript, June 29,
1917) (emphasis supplied).
64. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
65. A good example is private schools. Private schools are often a desirable educational alternative precisely because they are free of many of the governmental constraints on
public schools. Private schools can impart values, teach religion, enforce different disciplinary standards, select and dismiss teachers, and insist on sustained academic achievement
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munity conscience may reflect an ever-changing set of values that
all exempt organizations continually and painstakingly would have
to satisfy. As Justice Powell argued in his concurrence, the Bob
Jones majority "ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints."66 Similarly, Justice Brennan observed in a
case upholding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for
religious organizations that "private, nonprofit groups . . . receive
tax exemptions ... [because] each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." 67 In short, the majority in Bob Jones University ignored the public benefits of a heterogeneous society.
The Court could have achieved its desired result by using the
public benefit test alone, without the common community conscience element. An organization's racially discriminatory practices
may be so odious and contrary to the fundamental value of equal
treatment under the law that the organization could never assert
convincingly that it serves any public purpose. Regrettably, however, the vagueness of both the common community conscience
and the public benefit standards creates the danger that the IRS
may overzealously enforce the standards, resulting in unwanted social homogeneity.
in ways that public schools cannot. This freedom is the essence of their appeal. See Finn &
Devins, Reagan, Discrimination, and Private Schools, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 3;
Finn, Public Support for Private Education, pt. 1, AM. Eouc. (May 1982). Tax exemptions
are essential to ensuring this diversity and autonomy. Private schools derive 23% of their
revenues from their tax-exempt status or the related charitable deduction. See Hearings,
supra note 56, at 400 (testimony of John Esty, Jr., President, National Association of Independent Schools).
Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion that over 106,000
organizations filed § 501(c)(3) returns in 1981. He found "it impossible to believe that all or
even most of those organizations could prove that they 'demonstrably serve and [are] in
harmony with the public interest' or that they are 'beneficial and stabilizing influences in
community life.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2038.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2038.
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, the majority in Walz noted that "the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant
element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations that could
escalate to constitutional dimensions.'' I d. at 674. For a general discussion of constitutional
limitations on government in the promotion of behavior or ideology, see Kamenshine, The
First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
If the function of tax exemptions in encouraging diversity and conflicting views celebrated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Walz now gives way to one of ensuring harmony with the
public interest and community conscience, then only a narrower range of organizations
likely will qualify for tax exemptions.
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3. Analysis of the Tax Exemption and the "Tax Expenditure"
Budget
The Bob Jones University decision revived the unsettled debate over whether tax exemptions are really a form of government
aid. 68Because the sixteenth amendment authorizes the taxation of
all income "from whatever source derived,"69 Congress could have
constructed a comprehensive tax base,70 requiring organizations
that presently are exempt to conform to the same rules as taxable
entities. Instead, Congress from the outset has chosen not to tax all
possible entities but rather to tax selectively, often in pursuit of
various social objectives.
Not surprisingly, commentators have disagreed on the use of
exemptions, deductions, and credits to accomplish social goals. According to Professor Stanley Surrey,71 numerous tax incentive provisions have evolved in the Internal Revenue Code to assist particular industries, business activities, and financial transactions, or to
encourage certain social activities, such as contributions to charity.
He contends that a tax incentive is a cost to the government of the
tax revenue that it would have collected if the law did not provide
for that particular deduction, exemption, or credit.72 Therefore, a
tax incentive is an indirect expenditure of government funds to
support the particular purpose behind the incentive.73 Professor
68. See infra notes 96-llO and accompanying text.
69. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI. A comprehensive tax base would conform to the classical
definition of income as the increase in net market value of assets between the beginning and
end of. the taxable period, plus the market value of consumption (personal and living outlays) during the period, including gifts. For corporations with no consumption expenditures,
the measure would be the net accretion in asset values between the beginning and end of
the taxable period, without regard to distributions to shareholders.
70. HAIG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOME-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS IN THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (1921); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (1938).
71. See Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to Change,
12 TAX NoTEs 179 (1981); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Surrey, Tax Incentives].
72. For the fiscal year 1983, the Office of Management and Budget estimates that the
deduction for charitable contributions to education results in a revenue loss to the Treasury
of $925 million and that the "outlay equivalent," which would be the amount required to be
spent by government to accomplish the same objective, would be $940 million. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G 29, 35 (1983).
73. The following equation illustrates Surrey's position: if X represents what Congress
could tax as income, and if Y represents what in fact Congress taxes after allowing for exclusions, exemptions, deductions and credits, then X- Y is the aggregate cost of these special
provisions, or the indirect expenditure by the Government attributable to these provisions.
The tax expenditure budget breaks out this aggregate cost into the cost of each exclusion,
exemption, deduction, or credit.
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Surrey argues that the government could administer these incentives or subsidies more efficiently through direct governmental assistance in the form of grants, loans, interest subsidies, loan guarantees, and the like.7 ' Moreover, direct governmental assistance
would relieve the present inequity of forcing taxpayers who do not
benefit from these tax incentives to bear a greater share of the tax
burden. 715
On the other hand, Professor Boris Bittker argues that exemptions, and credits are not necessarily costs to the government. Instead, they reflect a legislative choice to omit certain transactions,
entities, or activities from the tax base.76
There is no way to tax everything; a legislative body, no matter how avid for
revenue, can do no more than pick out from the universe of people, entities,
and events over which it has jurisdiction those that, in its view, are appropriate objects of taxation. In specifying the ambit of any tax, the legislature
cannot avoid "exempting" those persons, events, activities, or entities that
are outside the territory of the proposed tax. In describing a tax's boundaries,
the draftsman may choose to make the exclusions explicit ("all property except that owned by nonprofit organizations"), or implicit ("all property
owned by organizations operated for profit"), but either way, the result is the
Tax expenditures increased from 24.8% of federal revenues in 1971 to 40.8% in 1982.

See CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OrncB, TAX ExPENDITURES: BUDGET CoNTRoL OPTioNs

AND

FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PRoJECTIONS FOR FiscAL YEARS 1983-1987 12-13 (1982). In the 1984
budget the estimated total is $388.4 billion. See PECHMAN, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIBS,
THE 1984 BUDGET 178 (Brookings Institution 1983). Whatever one's position on tax expenditures, the enormity of the amount must be a factor in any discussion of tax policy. For a
discussion of the "tax exemption as aid" issue, see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying
text.
74. [T]he deduction for charitable contributions is sometimes cited as a method
of government assistance that promotes private decisionmaking-the taxpayer, and
not the Government, selects the charity and determines how much to give. But a
direct expenditure program under which the Government matched with its grants,
on a no-question-asked and no-second-thoughts basis, the gifts of private individuals
to the charities they selected, would equally preserve private decisionmaking.
Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 71, at 719.
75. See id. at 713-38.
In other words, Professor Surrey maintains that if the government taxed all income at a
given percentage, a taxpayer would retain his income less the tax. But if the government
selectively taxes only a part of a taxpayer's income, then it affords him preferential treatment over other taxpayers who have income not so preferred. This result violates what economists call vertical and horizontal equity: all those with different levels of real economic
income should pay proportionately different taxes (vertical equity); all those with the same
levels of income should pay the same tax (horizontal equity). The Tax Expenditure Budget
proves that our present tax system has neither.
76. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MicH. L. Rsv. 1099,
1102-28 (1973); see also Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538, 539 (1969); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as
a Goal of Income Tux Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925, 934-58 (1967).
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same-taxpayers are separated from non-taxpayers. 77

Irving Kristol has criticized the tax expenditure concept of exemptions for similar reasons:
You are implicitly asserting that all income covered by the general provisions
of the tax laws belongs of right to the government, and that what the government decides, by exemptions or qualification, not to collect in taxes constitutes a subsidy. Whereas a subsidy used to mean a governmental expenditure
for a certain purpose, it now acquires quite another meaning-i.e., a generous
decision by government not to take your money. 78

Although the Bob Jones University Court did not explicitly adopt
Surrey's view that a tax exemption is government aid, its narrow
"common community conscience" standard could portend a tax
policy that would grant exemptions only to those organizations
that pander to community or majority sentiment. This system for
awarding tax exemptions would be much like the present system
for awarding federal grants, in that both would condition governmental benefits on community assent. This system, however, could
stray far from past policies that have encouraged the diverse and
conflicting views of a pluralistic society because it would inhibit
thousands of presently exempt entities from venturing into ideologically rough waters.
In sum, the majority opinion on tax exemptions-even though
the Court seems to favor Surrey's viewpoint-falls into a penumbra between the Surrey and Bittker positions. If the Court had
pursued its inclination and held that the tax exemption was government aid, then the IRS could develop a series of regulations,
similar to the system of rules associated with a government subsidy
program, to assure consistency and parity in the benefits granted.
By refusing to hold that a tax exemption is aid-a holding that
would have forced tax-exempt institutions to comply with a host of
government regulations associated with governmental subsidy programs79-while at the same time recognizing broad IRS authority
to develop rules governing tax-exempt status-an approach that
might result in the granting of tax exemptions on a toothless pro
forma basis80-the Bob Jones University Court established a
77. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969).
78. Kristol, Taxes, Property and Equality, 37 PUB. INT. 3, 14-15 (1974). The proponents of the Tax Expenditure Budget would contend that income may be defined as annual
accretions (or decretions) in wealth, plus consumption. To whatever extent this base is reduced by a deduction, exclusion, or credit, this amount becomes an indirect expenditure.
See supra note 71. See also Galvin, It's VAT Time Again, 21 TAX NoTEs 275 (1983).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110.
80. For example, current IRS enforcement procedures may not effectuate the goals
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rulemaking model that is inconsistent with its interpretation of the
tax exemption provision. In short, the majority failed to ensure the
enforcement of its view that tax-exempt institutions must reflect
community values because it failed to hold that tax exemptions are
government aid or that the ms must enforce the public policy requirement strictly.

B.

The Scope of IRS Rulemaking Authority

The Bob Jones University Court recognized broad IRS authority to determine what activities are "at odds with the common
community conscience."81 The majority noted that "ever since the
inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in those
administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those
laws."82 The Court thus rejected petitioners' argument that ms
rulemaking on tax exemptions is "a plain usurpation of Congressional law-making powers by the non-elected public servants of the
Internal Revenue Service."83
An analysis of the proper scope of the Service's rulemaking
authority must begin with the principle that Congress enacts the
tax laws and the ms has the responsibility of interpreting and enforcing them. The ffiS cannot legislate. 84 The issue, then, is to determine the permissible boundaries of IRS rulemaking. In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. CommissionerBIS the Court
described this power:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to
make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power
to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by
underlying the Bob Jones University decision because some schools that have been adjudicated as racially discriminatory under the 1964 Civil Rights Act have received tax exemptions anyway. See Devins, The Bob Jones Case-Over to Congress, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 29, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
82. Id. at 2031.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 22.
84. Congress has charged the Internal Revenue Service with the administration of the
tax laws. Because the language of this legislation is general, the Service issues regulations
and rulings to implement and explain its position on the law. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Treasury gives notice of proposed rulemaking and publishes proposed
regulations in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); Schmid, The Tax Regulations
Making Process-Then and Now, 24 TAX LAw. 541, 541-42 (1971). Mter a period of receiving written comments, the Treasury then promulgates the final regulations. The Service
issues revenue rulings, which usually deal with particular transactions or problems. See generally Note, Federal Tax Rulings: Procedure and Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 78 (1967).
85. 297 u.s. 129 (1936).
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the statute. . . . The statute defines the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a
standard by which such rights are to be measured. 86

In Bob Jones University the Court granted the Service almost
plenary rulemaking authority:
In the first instance . . . the responsibility for construing the Code falls to
the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable
problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the
administrators and on the courts to implement the legislative will. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to do so.61

The majority's interpretation, however, poses several problems.
First, the danger exists that the Service may selectively enforce its
regulations. 88 Justice Blackmun commented on this threat as
follows:
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This
may be very well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time . . . , but application of our tax laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion. 811
86. Id. at 134-35. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)
("There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.").
87. 103 S. Ct. at 2031. Curiously, in the first of the tax exemption cases, Green v.
Kennedy, the district court suggested that the IRS was blameless for not having changed
the policy of granting tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools. The court believed
that "[w]bat stops [the Commissioner of Internal Revenue] from extending disallowance to
the schools . . . is not unawareness of the significance of deductions, but rather certain legal
conclusions, including conclusions as to the scope of his authority under the Code." 309 F.
Supp. 1127, 1135 (D.D.C. 1970). See supra notes 20, 55-56. The court apparently felt that
the Commissioner should act only on an explicit congressional directive or a binding court
determination. In other words, the court envisioned a scheme in which the judiciary-not
the Service-would have primary authority in interpreting the meaning of the congressionally enacted Internal Revenue Code. Ironically, in Bob Jones University the Supreme
Court recognized the IRS's authority to promulgate regulations established through judicial
initiatives directed at the IRS. For a general discussion of the judiciary's usurpation of legislative authority on the tax-exempt school issue, see McCoy & Devins, supra note 56.
88. See Note, supra note 55, at 172-74.
89. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit echoed Justice Blackmun's concerns in Big Mama Rag, Inc.
v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980): "The standards [used by the IRS to
grant or deny tax exemptions] may not be so imprecise that they afford latitude to individual IRS officials to pass judgment on the content and quality of an applicant's views and
goals •... " Under this standard, the court held that the definition of "educational" contained in the IRS regulations under § 501(c)(3) was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1037.
See also Center on Corp: Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973)
(politically motivated denial of educational exemption by IRS is null and void); Comment,
Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimination, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 849 (1980). But cf. National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(neither § 501(c)(3) nor the first amendment compels granting educational exemption to
organization whose publications could not be found "educational" under any reasonable in-
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Nonetheless, the Bob Jones University majority believed that the
Service could be trusted not to breach this authority.90 The Court
sought to minimize the danger of selective enforcement by
stressing that "these sensitive determinations should be made only
where there is no doubt that the organization's activities violate
fundamental public policy."91
Second, the IRS may go either too far or not far enough in
regulating the wide array of tax-exempt organizations. The Service
now may examine the tax-exempt status of many organizations
against the stricter Bob Jones standard of "harmony with the public interest" and "common community conscience." This prospect
is disquieting because the standard, although strict, is open-ended
and beclouded. For example, the fate of an organization that does
not violate fundamental public policy but may not be clearly in
full compliance with the Bob Jones University standard is unclear.
Justice Blackmun's observation that too much administrative discretion may permit the IRS to administer tax laws in "so fickle a
fashion" continues to be a concern because the Internal Revenue
Code is so pervasive in its application and the opportunity for
abuse is so great. In the tax exemption area the stakes are too high
to tolerate a system that sometimes functions haphazardly or
desultorily.
Third, because of the pecuniary value of tax-exempt status, an
organization's survival may depend on the views of the particular
administration in office. For example, President Carter had sought
to impose racial quotas on tax-exempt private schools to further
terpretation of that term).
90. Contrary to this view, Justice Powell emphll}lized the following:
(T]he balancing of these substantial interests [of racial nondiscrimination in education
and of permitting unorthodox private behavior] is for Congress to perform. I am unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial
of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for
the Government, not to promote "public policy."
103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The majority responded by
contending that "The Court's opinion does not warrant that interpretation ... [because]
the policy against racial discrimination in education ... is sufficiently clear to warrant Justice Powell's .•• support [for] our finding of longstanding Congressional acquiescence..••" Id. at 2032 n.23. This contention, however, lacks any merit. Justice Powell's
concurrence addressed the narrow issue of whether§ 501(c)(3) prohibited racial discrimination in education. The majority, on the other hand, made broad pronouncements as to both
the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and the authority of the IRS to determine that meaning. See
supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
91. 103 S. Ct. 11t 2032.
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the nondiscrimination requirement.92 In contrast, President Reagan has attempted to lift nonstatutory regulations governing taxexempt private schools. 93 Although neither president succeeded,94
the threat remains that similar acts by the Executive branch could
bankrupt organizations whose existences depend on tax
exemptions. 915

C. Issues That the Court Did Not Resolve
1. Is a Tax Exemption Government Aid? 96

Although the Court recognized that tax-exempt status was a
governmentally conferred benefit,97 it did not say that tax-exempt
status is public aid. Whether a tax exemption falls within this classification raises issues under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which forbids granting federal aid to institutions that discriminate
on the basis of "race, color or national origin,"98 and under the
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). See Wilson, An Overview of
the IRS's Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organizations, 57 TAXES 515 (1979).
93. IRS News Release (Jan. 8, 1982).
94. Congress responded to the Carter proposal by passing riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 1980 that prohibited the IRS from spending money to implement it. See
supra note 53. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined the Reagan administration from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis
of race. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982), order continued in force,
No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
95. Another troubling possibility of allowing the IRS this broad power is that the IRS
might be too deferential and grant tax exemptions to organizations that clearly violate fundamental public policy. This threat is particularly significant because civil rights proponents
might not be able to utilize the courts to ensure that IRS procedures are sufficient. Civil
rights advocates currently are seeking judicial adoption of stringent enforcement standards
through the Wright v. Regan case that is now before the Supreme Court. See supra note 94.
Wright, however, ultimately may prove that civil rights groups lack a sufficiently particularized and identifiable harm to bring a lawsuit. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 56. The
Court's recognition of broad IRS rulemaking authority in Bob Jones University actually
suggests that the courts will limit their substantive intervention in this area. See Devins, A
Political Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, _ J. OF L. & PoL. _ ( )
(forthcoming). Congress likewise cannot be trusted for satisfactory guidance, as demonstrated both by its failure to make any sort of response to President Reagan's policy shift
and by its inability to pass any affirmative legislation on this matter.
96. Portions of this section are adopted from Devins, supra note 23, at 163-65.
97. See 103 S. Ct. at 2026-28. "When the Government grants exemptions or allows
deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the
donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors.'" !d. at
2028. "It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant
the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities .•• ."!d. at
2030.
98. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000-2001 (1964).
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establishment clause of the first amendment, which forbids government establishment of religion and limits federal aid to religiously
affiliated private schools. 99
The Civil Rights Act's total prohibition of governmental assistance to discriminatory institutions suggests that its coverage
should extend to the granting of tax exemptions to private
schools. 100 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reached this conclusion in McGlotten v. Connally/ 01 in
which it decided that a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
fraternal order is federal aid for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. 102
Part of the basis of this holding was the court's recognition that
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act recognized various
forms of indirect assistance as federal aid, such as the sale of government property at a reduced price.103 Furthermore, the court
found that the purpose of the Act "is clearly to eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefitting from federal financial
assistance.mo• The McGlotten decision may contribute to what has
been described as a "constitutionalizing" of the Internal Revenue
Code because it subsumes the revenue collecting function of the
Code under broader social policies derived from the Constitution.1015 Professors Bittker and Kaufman see an even broader impact of the court's reasoning:
[T)he "tax-subsidy" rationale of the McGlotten case has implications beyond the area of racial restrictions. . . . McGlotten's logic apparently prohibits the granting of tax allowances to a fraternal order that imposes such restrictions (based on its customers' religion, national or ethnic origin, political
allegiance, sex, and perhaps other characteristics) ..•. Finally, nothing in
McGlotten limits its reach to income, estate and gift taxes; "subsidies" in the
form of exemptions, deductions, special rates, and similar allowances may be
found in other federal taxes, as well as in state and local taxes. 108

The establishment clause requires a different analysis of tax
exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York/ 01 the Supreme Court held that a tax exemption is not governmental aid
99. U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ••••").See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§§ 14-8, -9 (1978).
100. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
101. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
102. Id. at 461.
103. See id. at 461 & n.7.
104. Id.
105. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
106. Id. at 62; see supra note 56.
107. 397 u.s. 664 (1970).
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under the establishment clause. The majority opinion explained
that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state.mos Although the majority's recognition in Walz that a religious institution benefits through a tax exemption seems inconsistent with its principal holding,109 establishment clause analysis focuses upon whether the "primary effect" of the exemption is to aid
the institution, not upon whether some benefit might accrue to the
institution. 110 Thus, a tax exemption might be permissible under
the establishment clause but impermissible under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
2. Can Some of a Tax-Exempt Organization's Practices Violate
Public Policy?
The Court in Bob Jones University avoided the question of
whether an organization providing a public benefit and satisfying
the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) could nevertheless be
denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law
or public policy by holding that racially discriminatory private
schools confer no public benefit.111 By limiting its holding to racial
discrimination in education, the Court neither encouraged nor discouraged the Service from adopting regulations to ensure compliance with other fundamental public policies. Of course, a requirement that an organization desiring tax-exempt status must comply
with all laws and all public policies could make the attainment of
tax-exempt status incredibly difficult. The amicus curiae Independent Sector112 speculated on the burden of forcing tax-exempt or108. Id. at 675.
109. Id. at 674-75.
110. Supreme Court precedents before 1977 had suggested that almost no form of aid
from the state, either to nonpublic schools or to families of nonpublic school students, would
be constitutionally permissible. The Court, however, has relaxed this restriction in recent
years. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1973) (tuition
grants and deductions and maintenance reimbursements declared unconstitutional), and
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (broad range of direct and indirect aid declared
unconstitutional), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (funding upheld for therapeutic and diagnostic tests but prohibited for field trips and instructional materials), and
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-61 (1980) (direct reimbursement to
private schools for state mandated testing upheld).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2031 n.21.
112. Independent Sector is a coalition of over 400 national voluntary organizations. Its
brief, which argued in favor of statutory affirmance of the Fourth Circuit decision in Bob
Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., focused on the need for the Court
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ganizations to comply with all fundamental public policies:
And what about the exempt organizations themselves? Would they become subject to myriad regulations and legal obligations . . . ? If so, retirement homes operated by particular religious charities might be forced to admit persons of any creed; private schools or organizations for girls or boys
might have to become coeducational; senior citizens groups might be forbidden to discriminate on the basis of age; community centers designed to serve
particular ethnic groups might have to open their doors to all comers; and
any exempt organization might be required to modify its physical facilities to
provide access to the handicapped. Resolving these and similar questions that
might be raised by an overbroad holding in this case could occupy exempt
organizations, their benefactors, the courts, and Congress for years to come. 113

The Court's stated limitation of its holding to the racial discrimination issue is no satisfactory answer to these concerns.
3. Does Granting of Tax-Exempt Status Trigger Constitutional
Scrutiny?
Several amici in Bob Jones University urged the Supreme
Court to hold that granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools would violate the fifth amendment's equal
protection comJ}onent. 114 These amici argued that the government's grant of a tax exemption is "state action" subject to constitutional restraints that prohibit government from providing
tangible financial aid to racially discriminatory private schools.115
The Court did not address this issue because it was able to decide
the case on statutory grounds. 116
Although the decisions on whether tax exemptions constitute
state action are inconsistent, at least some trends emerge. Courts
tend to find state action more often when racial discrimination is
at issuem and when the action sought to be stopped is the governto limit its holding to the issue of racial discrimination in education. See infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
113. Brief for Independent Sector at 20, Bob Jones Univ.
114. See Brief of William T. Coleman, Jr. at 57-62; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law at 30; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union at 17-32; Brief for
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers at 5-7.
115. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Mississippi statute that
would have provided textbook assistance to racially discriminatory private schools held unconstitutional). In Norwood, the Court recognized that "discriminatory treatment exerts a
pervasive influence on the entire educational process." Id. at 469.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24.
117. Courts generally apply a less stringent test for state action in race discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). This principle extends to tax exemption cases. For exam-

~

1378

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1353

mental grant of tax-exempt status rather than private discriminatory conduct. 118 Existing doctrine thus suggests that the Constitupie, in Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three judge
court), a federal district court in Wisconsin held that "the 'state action' doctrine was developed in response to efforts to eliminate private racial discrimination .... Accordingly[,]
• . . there might be a less demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient state involvement where there are allegations of racial discrimination." Id. at 667 (quoting Bright v.
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-94 (N.D. Ind. 1970)). Similarly, in Jackson v. Statler
Found. the Second Circuit noted the following:
Where racial discrimination is involved, the courts have found "state action" to exist;
where other claims are at issue (due process, freedom of speech), the courts have generally concluded that no "state action" has occurred.... [Thus, there is] a less onerous
test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more rigorous standard for other
claims.
496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see also Note, The Judicial Role in
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378,
399 (1979). Cf. Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 31, at 246-48 (arguing that religious
schools might be judged under a different "state action" standard since an important purpose of granting tax exemptions to such institutions is the avoidance of impermissible government entanglement with religion).
118. One commentator articulated the rationale for this approach as follows:
Because enjoining the private party necessarily will affect private interests, some
weight must be accorded these interests during the course of judicial inquiry. In such a
case, the court should inquire whether there is a sufficient nexus of governmental and
private action to transform the private actor into an agent of the government. When
the litigation is directed at the conduct of the government, however, the issue becomes
whether the government's actions encourage or support violations of constitutional
guarantees. Thus, the different implications of the remedies sought suggest that different constitutional standards should he formulated for the two types of cases.
Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions that Discriminate on the Basis of Race, 65 IowA L. REv. 258, 265-66 (1979). See also Brown, State Action
Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 97, 116-22 (1976). Case law also
supports this view. Compare Falkenstein v. Dep't of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Or.
1972) (three judge court) (state tax exemptions for racially exclnsive fraternal organization
held unconstitutional), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973), and
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. at 662 (state tax exemptions for racially discriminatory organizations enjoined), with New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States
Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination by exempt organization held
not state action); Junior Chamber of Com. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (lOth Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); and Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394 F.
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (memorandum opinion) (sex discrimination by congressionally
chartered organization held not state action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976).
Even if a court finds state action, it also must determine whether tax-exempt status is a
significant governmental benefit and whether the granting of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory institutions constitutes intentional discrimination. This Article has adopted
the view that tax exemptions are government aid for purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
See supra notes 96-110; see also Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 414, 421-23, 453-55 (1973). But see Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 105, at 63-68; Note,
supra note 55, at 180-84. The intentional discrimination requirement poses no problem in
the context of tax exemptions to private schools with stated policies of racial discrimination,
such as Bob Jones University (interracial dating) and Goldsboro Christian Schools (admissions). IRS knowledge of such policies satisfies the intent requirement established in Wash-
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tion may prevent the government from granting tax-exempt status
to racially discriminatory institutions.119 Fortunately, the Bob
Jones University Court was able to avoid this issue by deciding on
statutory grounds. Constitutional prohibitions are broader than
1964 Civil Rights Act standards. Consequently, "[a] broad holding
that tax exemptions are [state] action for constitutional purposes
could leave exempt organizations vulnerable to legal challenges on
a variety of theories having nothing to do with racial discrimination. That result would be contrary to the public interest in encouraging philanthropic activity . . . ." 120
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Bob Jones University decision exemplifies the risks of
leaving tax policy determinations to the courts. On one hand, the
Court went too far in interposing into the Code its own standards
of "common community conscience" and "public purpose."121 On
the other hand, the Court appeared to abdicate its supervisory
powers to the IRS. 122 This Article recommends that in the formulation of tax policy, courts should not supplant the role of Congress
as lawmaker by making broad tax policy pronouncements, but
should oversee the IRS to ensure that it properly implements and
enforces the tax laws.
Thus far Congress has relied on judicial and IRS initiatives to
define the tax exemption requirements and the parameters of the
IRS's rulemaking authority; it has interceded only when dissatisfied with the actions of the other branches.128 Congress, however,
must take the lead in resolving the tax-exempti<?n issue, as Justice
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (qualifying test for police officers with racially disproportionate impact held constitutional). If the IRS was unaware of a school's racially
discriminatory practices, however, under Washington that school would retain its tax-exempt status. The solution here would be to impute to the IRS notice of all schools that fail
to satisfy racial nondiscrimination enforcement standards.
119. The Green decisions all but concluded that tax-exempt status constituted state
action. In Green v. Kennedy the court issued the injunction, in part, because "of the substantiality of the grave constitutional questions presented by plaintiffs." 309 F. Supp. at
1133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In Green v. Connally the court finalized
that temporary injunction in the form of a permanent injunction. 330 F. Supp. at 1150.
Although it based its holding on statutory grounds, the court noted: "We are fortified in our
view of the correctness of the IRS construction by the consideration that a contrary interpretation of the tax laws would raise serious constitutional questions, such as those we ventilated in [Green v. Kennedy]." ld. at 1164.
120. Brief for Independent Sector, supra note 113, at 27-28.
121. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
123. See generally McCoy & Devins, supra note 56.
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Powell emphasized in his concurrence in Bob Jones University:
There no longer is any justification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently
has-in articulating and codifying its desired policy. . . . Many questions remain, such as whether organizations that violate other policies should receive
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). These should be legislative policy
choices. It is not appropriate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of developing national policy." ... The contours of public policy should be determined by Congress, not by j~dges or the IRS. 124

Congress, as a more capable legislator than the courts or the IRS,
is better equipped to formulate a tax exemption policy. The complexity of an indefinite and unidentified class of potential plaintiffs
with perhaps varying levels of grievance, an open-ended class of
defendant institutions neither entirely similar nor dissimilar to the
particular institutions in litigation, and the economic costs and
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Department of Justice
attorneys who have worked on this matter, Congress' passivity has been costly: "[T]he continued litigation of the issue in open-ended injunction suits, coupled with Congress' decision
to prohibit new policy shifts by the Treasury, has caused a paralysis among the three
branches of government. This paralysis has prevented the establishment of further guidelines to meet changing conditions." Ferguson & Henzken, supra note 11, at 103. Congress
should take the lead in resolving the tax exemption issue because Congress is a better legislator than are the courts. In a Brookings Institution study of court efforts to develop and
implement social policy, Donald Horowitz drew this conclusion:
The distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure of social resources on
individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits the courts for much of the important work of government. Retooling the judicial process to cope with the new responsibilities of the courts means enhancing their capacity to function more systematically in
terms of general categories that transcend individual cases. Some such innovations are
required. And yet, it would seem, there is a limit to the changes of this kind that courts
can absorb and still remain courts. Heightened attention to recurrent patterns of behavior risks inattention to individual cases. Over the long run, augmenting judicial capacity may erode the distinctive contribution the courts make to the social order. The
danger is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become altogether too much like them.
D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SociAL PoLICY 298 (1977). Professor Alexander Bickel similarly noted that the Court's institutional survival hinged on its ability to abide by the constraints of our system of divided powers. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OP
PROGRESS (1970). Considering recent congressional efforts to limit federal court jurisdiction,
Professor Bickel's fears seem well founded. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980

Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981).
Many jurists, however, feel that the courts do have a place in the shaping of social
policy. As Justice Cardozo suggested, "[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement
rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OP THE JuDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921). Similarly, Archibald Cox and James Hart Ely have suggested that
the Supreme Court has been at its best when it has introduced universalistic normative
principles in an effort to set the parameters of acceptable social behavior. A. Cox, THE RoLE
OF THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980).
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budgetary concerns affecting not only the parties but also others
demand that Congress glean and sift the social facts, weigh the
costs, and determine time periods for phasing in and phasing out
particular practices. 125
Given that Congress should take the lead in clarifying the requirements private schools must meet to attain tax-exempt status,
the issue becomes how such legislation should be formulated. As a
starting point, Congress should assess current enforcement procedures, which require that a tax-exempt private school "show affirmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students that is made known to the general public and
that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide
manner in accordance therewith." 128 A school can comply with
these current requirements if it (1) adopts formally nondiscriminatory policies in its charter or by-laws, (2) refers to these policies in
its advertising brochures, and (3) publishes annual notice of these
policies in a local newspaper of general circulation. 127 These procedures are insufficient; private schools adjudicated as discriminatory
under the fourteenth amendment and thus ineligible to receive direct government assistance often qualify for tax-exempt status. 128
The tax exemption rules ought to conform with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits government aid to private schools that
have no minority students or staff and that were formed or substantially expanded at or about the time of area-wide public school
desegregation. 129
Brown v. Board of Education130 is now almost thirty years old;
its call for due deliberate speed in the elimination of segregation in
the nation's school system still goes unheeded in many quarters.
The current emphasis on the need for educational excellence in
primary and secondary education is of no greater urgency than the
need to achieve equality of educational opportunity for every child.
Congress has the capability and the competency to act-and surely
125. See D. HoROWITZ, supra note 124, at 255-74.
126. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
127. !d. at 587-88.
128. Under 1964 Civil Rights Act standards, the government cannot grant aid to a
school if a judicial or administrative proceeding has determined that school to be discrinlinatory, or if the school was established at a time when public schools in its area were desegregating and the school cannot demonstrate that it was nondiscrinlinatory. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
129. For a similar proposal, in the form of a Model Statute, see Devins, supra note 23,
at 176-78.
130. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
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must act-in formulating effective national tax policy that incorporates Brown's objectives.

